Digital finance is plagued by risks of money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (TF), the scale of which is difficult to estimate. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that 2–5% of global GDP is laundered each year.
Addressing and mitigating the risks associated with these crimes is referred to as Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, or AML/CFT. Money laundering and terrorism financing is of particular concern for prudential supervision because it can directly threaten a financial service provider’s stability, safety, and soundness. The broader impact is how it undermines public trust in the financial system as a whole.
The vast scale of money laundering and terrorism financing suggests that transaction monitoring and customer due diligence (CDD) by DFS providers and other financial firms is not always fit-for-purpose. The UNODC figures also suggest that supervisory action in this area is not yet at the scale and depth required.
While regulation is critical, it has been recognised by regulators and international organisations, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), that applying AML/CFT regulation and supervision, and more recently counter proliferation financing (CPF) regulation and supervision, too rigidly or in a non-proportionate manner, can impact on financial inclusion.
Such application impedes much needed access to, and usage of, financial services by the financially excluded and/or underserved by both individuals and providers. At the same time, international standards highlight that financial exclusion is a contributor to financial integrity risks.
The following question then arises:
“How can prudential supervisors deliver proportional supervision of DFS providers to balance the demands of AML/CFT with financial inclusion?”
Supervisors need to adopt a risk-based approach to AML/CFT and CPF supervision, just like in any other area of supervision. They need to:
- understand ML/TF and PF risks associated with individual DFS providers
- understand the DFS industry
- allocate their resources accordingly.
Supervisors often have the power to act against a DFS provider that does not comply with AML/CFT law and regulations. To be effective, supervisors should have a range of tools, such as sanctions, which can be applied in a proportionate and graduated manner depending on the nature of the case.
Supervisors should be able to impose sanctions not only on DFS providers but also on their directors and senior management. Additionally, law enforcement should investigate and prosecute these types of offences. This would complement effective supervision, but it is not a substitute.
For example, a DFS provider that faces a severe administrative sanction imposed by a supervisor for lacking effective internal controls, such as the replacement of the board of directors, may also be subject to action by law enforcement agencies due to the same underlying problem.
It becomes clear that effective investigation by law enforcement agencies requires cooperation and information sharing with DFS supervisors.
The next video will discuss inclusive and proportional supervision, starting with the role of national risk assessments and law enforcement agencies. It will then focus on specific supervisory actions, such as supervisory reviews of institutional ML/TF risk assessments, compliance with CDD rules, detecting suspicious transactions and actors, and imposing corrective and sanctioning measures.
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This video has highlighted the dependence of inclusive insurance on data, especially as a means to foster inclusion and growth. You have also learned that a proportional approach, based on the risk profile of each insurance provider, is recommended by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors as the best means to balance inclusivity with prudential and consumer protection risks.
Additional Reading:
The following sources were consulted in preparing this video.
- FATF, 2025, Financial Inclusion and AML/CFT Measures, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Financialinclusionandnpoissues/guidance-financial-inclusion-aml-tf-measures.html
- FATF, 2021, Guidance on Risk-based Supervision, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Guidance-rba-supervision.html
In addition to these sources, we recommend including the following as additional reading on supervising AML/CFT:
- Kerse, M., de Koker, L., and Goyal, R., 2025, Podcast: Insights on FATF Guidance - Financial Inclusion and AML/CFT Measures (Part Two), Toronto Centre, https://torontocentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=607&Itemid=99
- Toronto Centre, 2024, The Role of Supervision in the Financial Inclusion of Forcibly Displaced Persons
https://torontocentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=515&Itemid=99 - Toronto Centre, 2023, Supervising Inclusive Financial Sector, AML/CFT Supervision section - https://torontocentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=464&Itemid=99#Toc148884792
Reflection Questions for Discussion
Please post your response using the forum functionality to share your insights and thoughts with your fellow students.
- After watching the video, do you have additional activities or questions you would include in your supervisory reviews of providers to mitigate AML/CFT risks? What are these, and how do you think they will improve the efficacy of your reviews?
- In what ways can technology enhance the effectiveness of supervision?